

Peter Webinger – Wolfgang Taucher

IRAQ

Economics & Migration



IRAQ

Economics & Migration



CONTENTS

Preface.....	5
Economic indicators.....	6
The economic situation in Iraq	10
The socio-economic dynamics of Baghdad	24
Migration from Iraq to the EU	40
Maps of Iraq	60
Sources	70
Imprint	86

PREFACE

Iraq continues to be one of the major source countries of asylum seekers in the European Union. An in depth look at the security situation and the economic environment in the country, as well as the resulting migration patterns shows the high level of volatility and the inter-connectedness with Europe. To understand the current developments in Iraq is therefore highly relevant for those working in the field of asylum and migration.

The current issue of our *regiones et res publicae* series features contributions by the AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT AUSTRIA (WKÖ), the Country of Origin Information Unit of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the Austrian Ministry of Defence: Isabel Schmiedbauer analyses the current state of the Iraqi economy, Katharina Ivanyi portrays the socio-economic dynamics of Baghdad, Martin Hofmann looks at the trends of Iraqi migration to the European Union and the maps of Iraq have been provided by the Institute for Military Geography.

Peter Webinger

Director General for
Migration

Austrian Federal Ministry
of the Interior

Wolfgang Taucher


Deputy-Director General
for Migration

Austrian Federal Ministry
of the Interior

ECONOMIC INDICATORS




Nominal gross domestic product in USD billion¹



Gross domestic product/capita in USD²




Population in million³






Real economic growth in %⁴




Inflation rate (Iraqi Dinar) in %⁵




IQD ↔ USD

Exchange rate of the national currency Iraqi Dinar (IQD) to USD;
1 USD = in IQD⁶






Goods exports of
the country
in billions of USD



Goods imports of
the country
in billions of USD



THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN IRAQ

Isabel Schmiedbauer

CURRENT SITUATION

Iraq's economy is gradually recovering from the economic challenges and domestic tensions of recent years. While the GDP grew by 11 % in 2016, Iraq recorded a minus of 2.1 % in 2017. In 2018, the economy picked up again and recorded an increase of around 1.2 % due to a noticeable improvement of the security situation and higher oil prices. A growth of 4.5 % is expected for 2019 and an upturn of around 2–3 % is also expected for the years 2020–2023.

The non-oil economy provisionally grew by 4 % in 2018, while oil production was lower than in 2017, in line with the OPEC agreement to cut production. In July 2019 OPEC extended production cuts for another 9 months.

After many years of armed conflict, the country seems to be moving back towards a certain level of normality, since the security situation has improved, the formation of the Iraqi government has largely been completed, and relations between Baghdad and Erbil have improved considerably.

Nevertheless, these positive developments continue to face challenges: Iraq finds itself in the midst of tensions between the USA and Iran and is trying to find a balance both in foreign and domestic policy. Reconstruction is progressing

sluggishly and the willingness of foreign companies to invest continues to fall short of expectations.

BUDGET 2019

The 2019 budget is 133 trillion Iraqi dinars (IQD) (approximately USD 112 billion), an increase of 27 % over the previous year. This was based on an oil export quota of 3.8 million barrels per day at a price of USD 56. According to the government, the increased government spending is expected to lead to a budget deficit of around USD 23 billion for 2019. With higher oil prices, this could decrease sharply.

A consensus was reached relatively quickly this year on the controversial issue of the amount of funding for the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan, which has been a constant issue in recent years. The central government assumes part of the expenses for public servants including the Peshmerga in the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan and in return the latter has to deliver 250,000 b/d [barrels per day] to the state oil company, SOMO.

95 % of government revenue comes from the sale of oil, and the country's prosperity depends on the development of international oil prices. Accordingly, the state budget fluctuates from year to year. In 2014 Iraq still had a budget of USD 140 billion.

IMF PROGRAM

In June 2015, the IMF adopted an emergency support program for Iraq, leading to the formation of a three-year stand-by agreement (SBA) in 2016, providing for a USD 5.4 billion loan to be disbursed in tranches. A prerequisite for disbursements was the implementation of reforms, including expenditure cuts while maintaining social expenditure, debt reduction and the fight against corruption. In the context of the IMF's last mission to evaluate Iraq's progress in May 2019, IMF representatives recommended a series of austerity measures to prepare for possible price shocks in the oil sector in the medium term. The agreement expires in summer 2019 and it is expected that Iraq and the IMF will agree on a new program, which will again be linked to the implementation of reforms.

ASSISTANCE LOANS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In addition, Iraq cooperates with other international financial institutions. Through various programs, the World Bank has provided Iraq with a total of IQD 5.6 trillion (USD 4.7 billion). Furthermore, in recent years Iraq has received loans from France and Japan amounting to IQD 608 billion (USD 512 million) and IQD 232 million (USD 195 million) respectively. France also made a commitment of EUR 1 billion in January 2019. The United Kingdom granted the country a tied loan of IQD 1.4 trillion (USD

1.2 billion). The EU has pledged IQD 100 trillion (EUR 75 billion) to Iraq for the implementation of various projects for the period 2014–2020. Priorities mentioned include rule of law, human rights, capacity building and sustainable energy.

CORRUPTION

Deep-rooted corruption is an enormous problem in Iraq and to blame for the lack of state revenue. Estimates of the extent of the damage caused by corruption are difficult to verify, but it is estimated that corruption has deprived the Iraqi state of at least USD 350 billion of revenue since 2003. Iraq was ranked by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in the world in 2017, as 169th out of 180 countries.

INFLATION

Since 2013, Iraq has been experiencing relatively moderate inflation rates, in particular as compared to the years 2008 to 2010. This development was mainly driven by declining costs for oil and gas products. Inflation was 0.4 % in 2018, but inflation is expected to reach 1.5 % in 2019. Also for the next few years, a steady increase in this figure is forecast.

ENERGY SECTOR

The most important economic factor in Iraq is and remains the oil sector. This accounts for about 95 % of the country's revenue and almost 100 % of its exports. Despite the volatile security situation, oil production has tripled since 2003. Most oil and gas deposits are unevenly distributed in the Shiite south and along ethnic lines in the Kurdish north. With 153 billion barrels, of which one third is in Kurdistan, Iraq has the fifth largest crude oil reserves attested in the world. The rapid increase in production between 2015 and 2017 makes Iraq the third largest oil exporter in the world, after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, and the second largest exporter of the OPEC countries.

OIL

Iraq (including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan) has gradually implemented restrictions imposed by OPEC on production volume, producing only approx. 4.51 million b/d in the first months of 2019. In July 2019 OPEC decided to maintain the production restrictions. Iraq could produce up to 5.9 million b/d and, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), become the world's third largest oil producer by 2030. However, existing risks include the danger of terrorist attacks targeting oil production facilities, the prevailing lack of water required for pumping of oil wells, the associated dependence on neighboring countries

and the dependence on foreign investment to modernize facilities. According to the Iraqi Oil Ministry, 67 % of oil exports will go to Asia in 2019, 20 % to Europe and 13 % to North and South America.

IRAQ – JORDAN: PIPELINE

Planning for the construction of a pipeline from the oil-rich southern Iraqi province of Basra to the Jordanian port of Aqaba and on to Egypt has resumed after the project stalled in 2014 due to conflicts with ISIS. However, no timetable has yet been published for the project, so completion is not expected until 2023.

GAS

According to the IEA, Iraq has gas reserves of 3.5 trillion cubic meters, making it the world's 13th largest reserves. Iraq is also the fourth largest gas flaring country in the world: in 2018, about 16 billion cubic meters of gas were flamed, just over 50 % of the gas produced in the field. This represents an annual economic loss of about USD 2.5 billion and would be sufficient to meet most of Iraq's unmet needs for gas-based power generation. In 2013, the Council of Ministers committed to end the routine flaring of natural gas by 2030, and in November 2016 Iraq signed the World Bank's "Zero Routine Flaring by 2030" initiative.

However, progress in reducing flaring has been limited so far, as associated gas volumes have increased since 2014, along increasing oil production.

RENEWABLE ENERGIES

With over 3,000 hours of sunshine per year, Iraq would be an ideal candidate for solar energy. However, as Iraq is one of the leading energy suppliers of fossil fuels, the interest of the Iraqi authorities has so far been limited. Due to insufficient generation capacity and rising energy demand, however, Iraq is now suffering from a serious shortage of electricity. The government has therefore announced its intention to increase the share of renewable energy in electricity generation to 10 % by 2020, but has not yet submitted any concrete plans in this respect.

AGRICULTURE

Iraq was known in the late 70s as the granary of the region and exported mainly rice and over 500,000 tons of dates. The agricultural sector has declined sharply in recent decades due to a lack of investment, counterproductive agricultural policies and the presence of ISIS. Now Iraq depends to a considerable amount on food imports, especially from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Currently, the authorities are trying to modernize local farms in order

to compete with imports and ultimately reduce dependence on imports. Another challenge is water supply: In recent decades, water levels have fallen by 40 % due to droughts caused by climate change, dam projects on the Euphrates and Tigris by Turkey and mismanagement in agriculture. Other challenges include overgrazing, no access to land due to violence, damage to land due to violence, displacement of local populations, reduced availability and higher costs of agricultural inputs and feed sources, and reduced veterinary care.

INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN BANKS

Some international banks such as Standard Chartered, Citibank, JP Morgan, as well as Turkish and Lebanese banks are already active in Iraq, but the Iraqi banking sector remains underdeveloped. Turkish banks are increasingly found in the Kurdistan region, while those from Lebanon cover central Iraq. The Lebanese Fransa Bank, Blom Bank and Audi Bank have opened branches.

AUTONOMOUS REGION OF KURDISTAN

The economic development of the Kurdistan region in recent years is far from that of the boom years, up to and including 2013. The autonomous region of Kurdistan has

had to contend with the following shocks in recent years:

- the lack of budget subsidies from Baghdad due to the dispute over the sale of oil produced in Kurdistan
- the presence of ISIS and the resulting increased expenses in the area of security
- the decline in the price of crude oil
- the referendum on independence held in 2017

The lack of remittances from Baghdad at the beginning of 2014 and the resulting very irregular salary payments to civil servants led to a steady decline in consumption. More than 70 % of the employees in the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan are state employed. The mood among business people has improved only slightly. The presence of ISIS led to an exodus of foreign workers, investments were put "on hold" and trade routes over land were partly eliminated.

In addition, the presence of ISIS meant that the region had to shoulder high additional costs in the area of defense and the care for refugees. The low oil prices led to lower revenues from the sale of the oil, as the sale was supposed to take place through the central government in Baghdad. The oil therefore had to be sold below market value. With approximately 1.4 million public employees, the Autonomous Region has to shoulder very high personnel costs.

INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM 2017

After long years of announcements, the Kurdish regional government held an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. With a turnout of 72 %, 93 % voted for the independence of the region. However, the central government in Baghdad did not recognize the result and sanctioned Erbil's action. The Kurdistan region lost massive autonomy in the referendum and is now worse off than before. The loss of control of the disputed areas around Kirkuk, including the oil fields, can be described as the most far-reaching consequence of the referendum.

RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

USAID estimates the financial needs for the reconstruction of Iraq at USD 150 billion, the World Bank at around USD 200 billion. In addition to infrastructure investments, Iraq is pursuing housing projects currently worth USD 25 billion, while it is estimated that USD 100 billion will be needed to meet current demand.

At the "Reconstruction Iraq" conference in Kuwait in February 2018, the Iraqi government estimated the necessary funds for the reconstruction of the country at USD 88 billion. Commitments by the international community (led by Turkey, the USA, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar) fell short of expectations and totalled USD 30

billion. More than 150 possible investment projects were presented at the conference. Financing provided by the World Bank in recent years has also only contributed to a limited extent to the implementation of projects in war-damaged areas, especially in the area of bridges and basic infrastructure. The funds from the budget required for the reconstruction of residential areas, hospitals, education and health facilities have so far been made available only to a limited extent. The hurdles for the reconstruction of the areas freed from ISIS are manifold: depending on the degree of destruction, this may progress faster or slower, depending also on the relationship of the local population to their liberators. In addition to prevailing corruption, areas are often under the control of local groups that need to be involved in projects, creating a difficult environment for potential investors and reconstruction in general.

STRIVING FOR AUTONOMY IN BASRA

Basra is the third largest city in Iraq and the most important port city in the south. The Majnoon oil field, 70 km outside of the city, is one of the largest in the world with reserves of 38 billion barrels of oil and contributes 90 % of Iraq's state revenue. A desolate infrastructure, corruption, high unemployment, the poor economic situation of the local population and the contamination of drinking water in the summer of 2018 led to recurring protests with riots and demands for independence. In April

2019, the Basra Regional Council voted for a change of status from Province to Autonomous Region in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution. Basra envisages activating a clause in the constitution that would allow the region to gain independence by holding a referendum. It can be assumed that Baghdad, as in the past, will not make any concessions, not only because the province of Basra is the most economically relevant, but also because other provinces would be likely to follow, which could destabilize the country.

IRAQ–JORDAN BORDER

After numerous meetings between delegations from both countries, in February 2019 the previous hurdles, that hindered the exchange of goods at the Treibil/Karameh border, were cleared. With the new agreement, Jordanian trucks can now cross the border without having to reload their goods onto Iraqi trucks. Conversely, Iraqi lorries are allowed to drive to Aqaba, load there and transport the goods under customs seal and surveillance from Aqaba to the Jordan-Iraq border. Iraqi customs clearance is then carried out by the customs authorities at the border in Treibil. From Treibil to Baghdad the trucks drive in convoys accompanied by Iraqi security forces. The transit time from Aqaba via Treibil to Baghdad is now about 36 hours. Additionally, further agreements were reached:

- the daily delivery of 10,000 barrels of Iraqi oil to Jordan
- the duty-free import of a large number of Jordanian goods into Iraq
- reduced port fees in Aqaba of up to 75 % for Iraqi imports

The improved security situation along the border will strengthen trade in the coming years.

TALKS ON OPENING THE BORDER BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA

For some time now, talks have been held between Iraq and Syria to reopen the Al Qaim border crossing (Al Bukamal on the Iraqi side). A direct land route would automatically increase exports many times over. Iraq could supply oil and Syria could support the Syrian pound with export earnings. It is not clear when the border will really be opened [for the movement of goods].

The text is based on the quarterly economic report of AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT AUSTRIA (WKÖ).

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF BAGHDAD

Katharina Ivanyi

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

After years of war, sanctions and conflict, Baghdad has recently begun to experience a period of relative calm and optimism, albeit in a climate of continuing political contestation and the neglect of a range of unaddressed problems – from sectarian mistrust in the wake of the defeat of ISIS, to the perception of widespread corruption and popular disenchantment with the ruling elite.¹

Any attempt to provide an accurate picture of the current socio-economic situation of the city, as well as the governorate of Baghdad, is faced with a basic, indeed, fundamental problem: a lack of reliable data.² This pertains to population figures, data regarding unemployment, labour force participation, poverty, urbanization, rural-to-urban migration, access to education and health care, housing, food security and infrastructure, including access to basic services, such as water, electricity, sewerage and waste disposal. While all of these constitute key socio-economic indicators, accurate figures relating to them are few and far between. Thus, existing studies of the socio-economic situation of Baghdad are by and large inadequate to provide a fully reliable picture and caution is necessary in uncritically approaching them. In the case of macroeconomic indicators, for instance, economist

Frank Gunter points out that it is often not so much a lack of data that is the problem, but the poor quality and inconsistency of them. Thus, “there is no shortage of data on Iraq’s macroeconomy. The problem is that the data available is often inconsistent. When it comes to the size of the country’s population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment, and inflation, not only do different sources provide very different numbers but also the trend of a single variable from a single source is often unreliable.”³ This, according to Gunter, is often due to changes made to the composition of variables or their method of estimation. Moreover, he explains, “decades of internal and external conflict have made it difficult and often dangerous to gather data.”⁴ Large-scale smuggling to and from Iran, Syria and Turkey furthermore distorts figures on international trade and investment. Indeed, the role of the informal economy – substantial and growing – is not gauged, or only partially so, “resulting in a wide gap between economic activity reported in official statistics and the reality on the ground.”⁵

Addressing the socio-economic challenges Iraq faces is, in fact, one of the major tests of the current government under Prime Minister 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi. Thus, as political scientist Harith Hasan has argued in a 2018 policy brief for the Atlantic Council, “finding political and legal frameworks to improve governance and make the government more inclusive, as well as preventing discrimination along ethnic

and sectarian lines, are necessary to stabilize Iraq in the short- and mid-term. But to maintain peace, prevent further radicalization, and avoid the emergence of another insurgent group, it is important to address the economic and social challenges in Iraq in order to avert further turmoil and instability."⁶

These challenges consist of, first and foremost, a major demographic boom. The country's population – currently estimated at around 40 million⁷ – is reckoned to be growing at a rate of 2.6 % to 3 % a year.⁸ That is to say, the population of Iraq is expected to increase to 53 million by 2030;⁹ according to an estimate of the Pew Research Forum, it will have reached 80 million by 2050.¹⁰ The median age of Iraq's population, according to the CIA, is currently 20 years-of-age.¹¹ That makes for an extremely young society. Indeed, “almost 40 % of the population is under 14 years old, 20 % is between the age of 14 and 24.”¹² Coupled with continuing growth, this has grave repercussions not only on the sustainability of Iraq's resource base, which finds itself under increasing pressure, but also on social relations, security and migration.¹³

The effects of these demographic trends on the country's labour market are likewise serious. According to Gunter, “Iraqis aged less than 15 years account for almost 43 % of the population.”¹⁴ “Providing productive employment for each cohort of young persons is the most important challenge facing Iraq. Each year about 850,000 Iraqis become old

enough to work. Adjusting for each year's retirements and deaths among the working population, as well as the very low labor force participation rate among women, means that the nation must create about 250,000 additional jobs each year. In other words, in any year when the country fails to create a quarter of a million net new jobs, there will be an increase in the pool of mostly male, mostly uneducated, unemployed. This growing pool of unemployed discouraged young men without any expectation of finding a good job [...] is a major source of instability."¹⁵

While the World Bank has pointed to a number of positive economic developments in its latest country update on Iraq, such as a growth in real GDP by 0.6 % in 2018 (as opposed to the 2017 contraction of 1.7 %), it also notes a range of challenges the country faces.¹⁶ These include one of the lowest labour force participation rates in the world with only 48.7 % – a figure even lower in the cases of youth (26 %) and women (12 %). The World Bank further notes an increase in official unemployment to 9.9 %, i.e. beyond the level of 2012, with high numbers of youth unemployment and women's unemployment. It also highlights a general labour force underutilization, especially among certain segments of society, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs). The country's official underemployment rate, according to World Bank figures, is at 17 %.¹⁷ Among the positives, the World Bank explains Iraq's growth in real GDP by improved security, following the defeat of ISIS,

and a pick-up in oil prices. It also notes a growth by 4 % of the non-oil economy¹⁸ – a sector the state wants and needs to expand.¹⁹ Moreover, in 2018 the Iraqi government was able to secure a positive fiscal balance, an achievement most likely to be reversed in 2019, with a significant increase in government spending foreseen in the new budget.²⁰

GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY AND ECONOMY

The governorate of Baghdad is Iraq's smallest, yet most populous governorate, comprising the city of Baghdad – Iraq's largest city, the capital of both the governorate of Baghdad and the federal republic of Iraq.²¹ Located on the river Tigris, about 530 km from the headwaters of the Persian Gulf, Baghdad city is situated on a flat alluvial plain, where the Diyala River joins the Tigris, about 40 km east of the Euphrates.²² It is made up of eight districts: al-A'zamiyya, al-Karkh, al-Ka'zimiyya, al-Mansur, Sadr City, al-Rashid, al-Rusafa and 9th of Nisan. The rest of the governorate of Baghdad includes the districts of al-Mada'in, Taji, Tarmiya, Mahmudiyya and Abu Ghraib.²³

With the creation of the modern state of Iraq in 1920, following the First World War, the former provincial capital of the Ottomans began to rise to renewed prominence. The new Hashimite Kingdom gained independence from the British in 1932 and “over the next half century, the city grew prodigiously

and took on all the characteristics of a modern metropolis.”²⁴ Baghdad used to witness periodic floods up until 1956, when the Samarra' Barrage was completed on the Tigris, 130 km north of the city. Once the floods were halted, the city began to spread beyond its earlier confines. Indeed, “from a built-up area of about 10 km² at the beginning of the 20th century, Baghdad has expanded into a bustling metropolis with suburbs spreading north and south along the river and east and west onto the surrounding plains.”²⁵

From the 1958 coup, which turned Iraq into a Republic, through the 60's and the coming to power of the Ba'th Party, Baghdad witnessed much turbulence and transformation, politically as well as in socio-economic terms. The Ba'thist government would soon achieve “relative stability and internal development,” however, “particularly after 1973, when a rise in world oil prices greatly increased revenues to the government and the populace. It was during this period that Baghdad underwent its greatest expansion and development.”²⁶

This urban flourishing and socio-economic development came to a halt in the 1980's and 90's, when first the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988), then the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War (1990 – 1991), followed by the UN sanctions regime (1990 – 2003) not only ended economic growth, but led to large-scale devastation. Indeed, Baghdad was heavily bombed during the Gulf War as well as during the

2003 invasion. Sectarian violence following the invasion, in particular between 2005 and 2007, further exacerbated the situation. Thus, a destroyed infrastructure, paired with neglect and recurring violent upheaval, was punctuated with periodic rebuilding and development.²⁷ Chronic financial constraints, corruption, a political system hampered by clientilism, as well as crony capitalist networks in government and bureaucracy have continued to impede advances.²⁸

The importance of Baghdad city as “Iraq's main economic hub”, however, cannot be overestimated.²⁹ According to the NCCI, Baghdad “is the center for commerce, banking and the financial sector.”³⁰ It is “the undisputed commercial, manufacturing, and service capital of Iraq.”³¹ Moreover, next to Basra and Kirkuk, Baghdad is “a crucial location for the petroleum industry. The governorate’s eastern Baghdad oil field is Iraq’s largest proven reserve of crude oil. Other industries like leather, cement and tobacco are also found in the governorate.”³² Indeed, “most of Iraq’s manufacturing [...] is concentrated in and around Baghdad. At least half of the country’s large-scale manufacturing and much of its smaller manufacturing is located in the Baghdad governorate.”³³ Baghdad is also “well connected to other parts of the country by both road and rail, and is home to the Baghdad International Airport [...]. The capital also hosts four universities and a large number of primary and secondary schools, and technical institutions for research and education.”³⁴ In fact, the city is host to a rich cultural life and has “long been an active cultural centre for the Arab world.”³⁵

POPULATION, DEMOGRAPHY AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION

Population figures for Baghdad vary considerably, depending upon source, and it is often not clear whether a given figure refers to the estimated population of the governorate or the city of Baghdad. According to a recent article in *The Guardian*, for instance, “the population of Iraq’s capital nears 10 million and the city prepares to join the ranks of the world’s megacities.”³⁶ According to the CIA Factbook, Baghdad has a population of 6.6 million.³⁷ The World Population Review presents Baghdad’s population as 7.2 million;³⁸ according to the website *Populationof2019*, that figure is 9.7 million.³⁹

According to Frank Gunter, “in the absence of a recent census, current population estimates – regardless of the source – are based on multi-decade extrapolations of old census data adjusted by estimates of deaths, international refugees, the results of a variety of smaller surveys, and rules of thumb.”⁴⁰ This applies to Baghdad as much as it does to other cities and governorates, as well as to the overall population figures for the country. What’s more, “uncertainty about the actual population of Iraq reduces the usefulness of most other data [...]”⁴¹ That is to say, data calculated on the basis of population figures that are uncertain, must by necessity, be treated with caution. As Phebe Marr has pointed out, “the population of greater Baghdad grew tremendously after WWII.”⁴² It is composed,

for the most part, of Arab Muslims, both Shi‘i – the majority – and Sunni.⁴³ Kurds and Christians (Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) also form substantial communities, although the numbers of both are reported to have declined since 2003.⁴⁴ Migrants from other parts of Iraq, especially rural migrants, have been particularly drawn to the city,⁴⁵ as have – in recent years – foreign workers from South Asia, such as from Bangladesh and India, supplying cheap labour in the construction or restaurant industries.⁴⁶

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS⁴⁷

EMPLOYMENT AND THE LABOUR MARKET

According to the NCCI, Baghdad's unemployment rate is lower than the national average. This is despite the large numbers of unemployed youth in the city.⁴⁸ Thus, according to a 2014 UNDP survey, only a total of 22.2 % of youth were employed in Baghdad (34.3 % of males and 6.6 % of females).⁴⁹ Labour force participation of women in Baghdad is particularly low;⁵⁰ the same goes for IDPs.⁵¹ But again, as far as unemployment figures go, Frank Gunter cautions that “one should have little confidence in the accuracy of any given estimate.”⁵²

The public sector is Iraq’s largest employer and in Baghdad, too, “hundreds of thousands of citizens work for the government, directly or indirectly, in the civil service, in government-run educational institutions, and in government-

owned industrial and commercial enterprises.”⁵³ Nonetheless, according to IOM, private sector jobs constitute the source of income for 44 % of the population of Baghdad.⁵⁴

According to Hanaa Abdul Jabbar Saleh, “the percentage of informal labour in urban areas reached 51.6 %.”⁵⁵ In Baghdad, as in other urban areas of the country, informal labour plays a significant role in the economy.⁵⁶

POVERTY

In 2012 the overall poverty rate in Iraq was 18.9 %;⁵⁷ that in Baghdad 12 %.⁵⁸ The overall poverty rate increased to an estimated 22.5 % in 2014, but is expected to decline, according to the World Bank.⁵⁹ UNAMI puts the country’s overall poverty rate at 23 %.⁶⁰ The poverty rate in Baghdad is thought to have increased significantly since 2012. No recent figures have been available, however.⁶¹

Since poverty rates are usually higher in rural areas, the outer districts of Baghdad governorate might be more affected by it. Moreover, women-headed households and IDPs are especially vulnerable. Child poverty also represents a serious issue, with roughly a fifth of Iraqi children said to be poor.⁶² Exact figures for Baghdad could not be established, however. According to EASO, “shantytowns and beggars have become widespread across Baghdad.”⁶³ Deputy Director of Baghdad provincial council, Atwan al-Atwani, for instance, stated in a 2016 interview that local authorities did not have “data

on the numbers of beggars and street children although this phenomenon has increased in an unusual and alarming way lately.” “According to Baghdad’s provincial council, as of 2016, there were more than 249 complexes occupied by squatters, each hosting between 17,500 and 20,000 people living in poverty.”⁶⁴

FOOD SECURITY

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported in February 2019 that nearly 2.4 million people in Iraq were susceptible to food insecurity.⁶⁵ Drought has been an increasing problem for the agriculture sector, including in areas near Baghdad. Thus, “increasingly dry seasons have not only resulted in reduced rainfall, but also made the water that is available salty and unsuitable for farming.”⁶⁶ This, in turn, has negatively impacted wheat production, for instance, leading to sharp decreases in yield, increased imports and with it, sharp increases in the price for this sort of food commodity.⁶⁷

According to an assessment of the World Food Programme from 2015 of domestic Iraqi food production, as well as imported commodities, there was “low yield and production rates, despite the size of the area planted with crops, vegetables and fruits.”⁶⁸ The study found “high rates of import dependency for a number of food commodities. For example, import dependency reached 99.86 % for sugar, 82.96 % for oils, 15.60 % for rice, 50.31 % for dairy products, and 2.73 %

for wheat flour. This clearly indicated that, after accounting for domestic food production, the availability of sufficient aggregate food supply in Iraq depended substantially on its ability to finance food imports to cover the gap, which in 2015 saw a 2.1 % ratio of food exports to imports. The demand for imported food has continued to grow, with local agricultural production failing to keep pace with population growth [...] This situation could be further aggravated in the future, due to factors such as continued drought and the noticeable impact of climate change.”⁶⁹ No specific studies on Baghdad were available. Significantly, “the nominal prices of all food commodities show an increasing trend.”⁷⁰

WATER

According to a 2018 loan proposal by the World Bank, “about 18 % of the population [of Baghdad] deals with daily service interruptions, and in the hot summer months, service interruptions are even more frequent. Leakage from sewer pipes contaminates potable water networks and groundwater aquifers, which aggravates health and environmental problems.”⁷¹ Baghdad is also “one of the governorates impacted by outbreaks of waterborne diseases. [...] Contaminated water supply and improper disposal of sewage force families to spend a significant fraction of their income on medical treatment and to purchase bottled water.”⁷² According to the US non-profit organization EPIC, Iraqi drinking water and agricultural water are “often of poor quality, helping spread waterborne illnesses like Typhoid, Dysentery, Hepatitis B,

and Cholera. In major urban centers, including Baghdad and Basra, Iraq's Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) – which measures the degree of organic material pollution in water – reached 36.2 mg/L, more than three times the national limit of 10 mg/L outlined by both Iraqi government and World Health Organization standards. Alarming, these figures represent a significant increase in drinking water pollution after 2005, when the BOD measured 1.04 – 12.12 mg/L. By 2012, Iraqi hospitals were reporting sharp increases in the number of patients suffering from waterborne diseases. For example, the total number of diarrhea cases (an effective indicator of water pollution) reached 1,058,217, with 350 fatalities. In Baghdad's Sadr City, for example, the only source of clean water is bottled – an impossible expense for many of the poorer residents there.”⁷³

Indeed, “Baghdad is one of the governorates most impacted by outbreaks of waterborne diseases. About 14 % of diarrhea cases registered in 2011 occurred in Baghdad, which also topped the governorates in terms of number of deaths from diarrhea. Similarly, the incidence of typhoid and other waterborne diseases is higher in Baghdad compared to national averages.”⁷⁴

In its 2017 Integrated Location Assessment II, IOM noted that inefficient sewerage overall affected 30 % of the population [of IDPs of the Baghdad districts of Mahmudiyya and Abu Ghraib].⁷⁵

HOUSING

According to the World Bank, “Iraq has a large and growing housing deficit following decades of sanctions, conflict, and substantial under-investment in new formal housing, which has been exacerbated by rapid population growth, ongoing urbanization, and large inflows of displaced people. [...] The rapidly growing demand for housing has been fueled by population growth [...] and will likely further accelerate as the average household size continues to decrease. [...] The existing housing stock is of low quality, partly because substandard informal housing has been growing rapidly, with nearly 2.4 million people living in slums.”⁷⁶ Estimates from 2014 indicated that “30 to 40 % of the population lives in very poor housing conditions and that at least 10 % of housing units are overcrowded and lack proper maintenance [...]. Up to 90 % of homes built in the last 30 years are self-constructed and likely to be informal. In Baghdad alone, more than 740,000 people were living in slums in 2013, most of whom had no access to water, sanitation, or other basic public services.”⁷⁷ According to UNAMI, the UN assistance mission in Iraq, “71 % of Iraqis currently live in urban areas. More than half of the urban population lives in slum-like conditions.”⁷⁸ In Baghdad, “larger dwellings have been divided and subdivided by families to deal with the growing housing crisis, largely illegally. Squatter neighbourhoods have taken over old army bases from the Saddam Hussein era [...]. Districts once designed as utopian low-income housing projects have been built over.”⁷⁹ According to Reuters, “power

outages are commonplace and heavy-duty generators spew dark fumes, adding to some of the worst pollution in a smog-heavy region. Raw untreated sewage is still dumped into the Tigris and there are few accessible riverbanks and open spaces for children to play.”⁸⁰

Informal settlements constitute a substantial part of the Baghdad housing stock, although in the literature no common definition of the term exists. In 2017, for instance, the government of Iraq stated in its report to the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) that there were 250 informal housing settlements in Baghdad.⁸¹ However, a mapping exercise carried out by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, in collaboration with UN-Habitat, in 2017 found that there were 1,022 informal settlements in Baghdad, out of 3,687 informal settlements recorded in 12 governorates overall, inhabited by about 3.2 million persons.⁸² This raises the question of definitions and – again – comparability: What constitutes an “informal” settlement? And what to make of the great discrepancy in the data provided by different sources?

CONCLUSION

In order to gain a more detailed picture of the current socio-economic situation in Baghdad – beyond broad generalizations – more comprehensive study is necessary. One of the main obstacles to this is the lack of reliable data. Nonetheless, some broad outlines of the challenges ahead are clearly discernible: The main socio-economic issue confronting Iraq is a major demographic boom, putting considerable pressure on Iraq's labour market. This pressure is felt in Baghdad, Iraq's most populous governorate and main economic hub, as much as in other parts of the country. Indeed, many of the socio-economic trends in Baghdad mirror those of other parts of Iraq; some differ, however. Thus, Baghdad's unemployment rate is lower than national average. The number of unemployed youth, however, is high, in line with the general trend, as is the low participation of women in the labour force. In line with a broad national trend is also a rise in poverty, which Baghdad has experienced over the last few years. Food security is tenuous, although Baghdad specific studies have not been available. In terms of access to water, about 18 % of Baghdad's population deals with daily service interruptions. A contaminated water supply and improper disposal of sewage has led to the outbreak of waterborne diseases, forcing families to spend a significant amount of their income on bottled water. Finally, Iraq is struggling with a substantial housing deficit, a fact that manifests itself in Baghdad in a large and growing number of informal settlements and slums.

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ TO THE EU

Martin Hofmann

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ - MAIN DRIVERS

The main drivers of international migration are war, civil war and conflict; economic and income disparities between the world regions; socio-economic development in developing countries and demographic imbalances that result in movements from poor and young regions to rich and older regions. To varying degrees, these factors have impacted migration flows from Iraq to the European Union both in terms of their quantitative magnitude and the prevailing migration patterns and will continue to do so. Nonetheless, conflict has to be perceived as the main driver. Traditionally, migration from Iraq to the European Union was mainly flight migration. War, civil war and state repression resulted in internal displacement on a massive scale or flight to neighbouring countries. This was the case in the aftermath of Operation Desert Fox in 1998. This was also the case when violent clashes escalated into open civil war in 2006 and an estimated 1.8 million Iraqis had to flee the country and 1.6 million became internally displaced.¹ And it was the case when Sunni rebels led by ISIL seized large parts of the Iraqi territory in 2014. Initially, a worsening of the security situation had the effect of reducing flows from Iraq, since it was obviously not possible for migrants and/or refugees to leave the country immediately. Migration and refugee flows grew in

size as soon as the situation in Iraq or in the neighbouring countries permitted movements to Europe or allowed them to be organized. Consequently, refugee flows reached the territory of the European Union with a delay, but the sharp increases in the number of asylum applications in the years after 2000, in 2007/2008 and 2015/2016 had always correlated with the security situation in Iraq. Conversely, improvements in the security situation, such as in 2008, had often resulted in a significant decline in the European application statistics, for instance in the years 2008 to 2011.

As regards socio-economic and development indicators, as a second set of main drivers of migration, the situation in Iraq appears more favourable than in other major countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU. The Human Development Index (HDI)² for 2017 puts Iraq at position 120 out of 189 countries, which represents an increase of Iraq's HDI value by 19.8 % since 1990.³ Life expectancy at birth and mean years of schooling have increased as well as the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita which in 2017 was almost 66 % higher than in 1990. Thus, and with an average of USD 16,560 the Iraqi GNI per capita was more than eight times higher than the GNI per capita in Afghanistan, another major country of origin of asylum seekers in Europe.⁴ However, the average GNI per capita in the EU is still more than three times higher than the one in Iraq and this disparity continues to constitute an incentive for migration, especially when looking at another set of

indicators. Official unemployment as share of the total labour force is at a comparatively low 8 %. But out of the younger generation a staggering 40.7 % is considered not in education, employment or training. The rate is better for male youth (16.9 % not in education, employment or training) than for female youth (65.5 %), altogether it implies that the majority of young Iraqis have only bleak opportunities in their home country. This structural lack of opportunity induces many of them to try their luck abroad, a pattern that will be additionally fed by demographic developments as the final main driver of migration from Iraq. Until 2030 the number of Iraqis in the age group 0 – 34 years will increase by app. 10.9 million (or 40 %) from 27.1 million to 38 million.⁵

Notwithstanding the impact of economic and demographic factors, it can be assumed that also in the future the security situation in Iraq will be the most important driver of migration of Iraqi nationals. The Global Peace Index 2019 ranks Iraq at position 159 out of 163 countries and among the five least peaceful countries in the world (Iraq, Yemen, South Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan).⁶

The security situation has improved moderately in 2019 due to the military defeat of ISIL and according to the GPI the situation has improved in terms of refugees and IDPs as a percentage of the population, the political terror scale and the actual impact of terror. However, the “societal security

and security” domain of the GPI ranks Iraq fourth-to-last, only the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Afghanistan are considered even less peaceful. Protracted conflict situations like the one in Iraq also imply that ever larger shares of the population lose their trust in the system and institutions and give up hope that the economic and the security situation will improve even in the long run. Iraq is among the five countries in the world with the least confidence in institutions and political processes, as well as high levels of corruption. Finally, a growing share of the Iraqi population is affected by environmental risks and climate change. According to the GPI, 10 % of the Iraqi population live in climate hazard areas and water scarcity becomes a growing problem.

Based on past migration patterns, it can be expected that also in the future both migration and flight migration from Iraq will depend on the security situation in the country and will increase or decrease accordingly. But the protractedness of the conflict, the deepening distrust in governance and lack of social security, the low opportunities for the young coupled with the demographic increase of this age group and the growing impact of environmental and climate factors might also imply that migration and flight migration from Iraq become increasingly decoupled from the actual security situation in the country and turn into a self-perpetuating pattern.

IMMIGRATION FROM IRAQ TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The total number of Iraqi citizens registered in EU Member States grew by about 81 % over the last decade. For those EU MS where annual data are available for the years 2008 to 2018,⁷ the total number of Iraqi citizens increased from app. 184,000 in 2008 to app. 332,600 in 2018.⁸ Thus, related Eurostat figures refer to the total stock of Iraqi citizens in a given year but do not take into account previous naturalisations. This implies that the number of persons “born in Iraq” and residing in the European Union is in reality higher. Unfortunately, there are no specific data on persons “born in Iraq” for Germany, the country that hosts by far the largest community of Iraqi citizens. However, the total number of acquisitions of citizenship by former Iraqi citizens in the whole EU, also including Germany, was app. 84,600 in the period between 2013 and 2017.⁹ Taking into account these naturalisations a total of between app. 410,000 to app. 420,000 persons “born in Iraq” and residing on the territory of an EU Member State is a plausible estimate. The Iraqi population in the EU is predominantly male. 59.1 % of all Iraqi citizens registered in the EU are men. The high share of men among Iraqi citizens is closely linked to the fact that flight migration has been the main migration pattern between Iraq and the EU, as asylum seekers who have to undertake a long and perilous journey to reach a safe country in Europe are predominantly male as well.

It is a well-observed fact that nationals from a given third country tend to concentrate in only a small number of EU Member States. Such “clustering” can also be found when it comes to immigrants from Iraq. In 2018, app. 87.8 % of all Iraqi citizens (app. 292,000 in total) resided in five EU Member States. This was slightly less than in 2008 when app. 93.2 % of all Iraqi nationals had resided in the top five EU destinations. Between 2008 and 2018 Germany remained the most important European destination by far, hosting about 60.6 % of all Iraqi immigrants in the EU (or app. 201,695 in total), followed by the United Kingdom with app. 10.5 % (or app. 35,000 in total), Sweden with app. 7.6 % (or app. 25,300 in total), Belgium with app. 4.6 % (or app. 15,400 in total) and Austria with app. 4.8 % (or app. 14,500 in total). Thus, there were some notable shifts in the statistics of EU MS regarding the number of Iraqi citizens present on their territories during the last decade. While the number of Iraqi citizens in Austria and Belgium increased by seven times and more between 2008 and 2018, their totals decreased in Denmark and Sweden by app. 46.6 % and app. 36.8 % respectively. However, these shifts seem to be resulting from the fact that Denmark and Sweden accounted for disproportionately high shares of naturalisations of Iraqi nationals. Between 2013 and 2017 Sweden accounted for app. 39.8 % of all naturalisations of Iraqi nationals in the EU (app. 33,600 in total) and Denmark for app. 9.9 % (app. 8,400 in total). Conversely, Austria and Belgium accounted for less than 1 % of all Iraqi naturalisations over the same


period. A look at residence permits confirms that flight migration is the main migration pattern between Iraq and the EU. Out of the total of app. 70,800 first permits issued for Iraqi nationals in the EU in 2017, the most recent year where data are available, only 1.4 % (or app. 970 in total) were issued for the purpose of remunerated activities and only 1.7 % (or app. 1,200 in total) for the purpose of education. Conversely, 22 % of all first permits for Iraqi nationals (or app. 15,600 in total) were issued for the purpose of family reunification. The rest (app. 75 % or app. 53,000 in total) were issued for “other purposes”, presumably also including various types of provisional or tolerated stay.¹⁰

REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED


For the year 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered a total of 646,383 refugees and asylum seekers originating from Iraq. More than half of them were registered in two countries of destination, namely Germany (176,312 persons in total or 27.3 %) and Turkey (152,976 in total or 23.7 %). These two top destinations were followed by Jordan (65,922 in total or 10.2 %), Syria (45,211 in total or 7 %), Iran (28,268 in total or 4.4 %), Sweden (23,380 in total or 3.6 %), Lebanon (19,321 in total or 3 %), Austria (15,219 in total or 2.4 %), Netherlands (11,767 in total or 1.8 %) and the USA (9,999

in total or 1.6 %).¹¹ In addition, there is a total of 1,744,980 persons considered internally displaced in Iraq and a total of 4,211,982 persons who have returned to Iraq – in their majority – to poor and difficult living conditions. Based on these figures it can be assumed that the total number of Iraqi citizens who are refugees, internally displaced or returnees to their home country amounts to more than 6.7 million persons.¹² Consequently, the potential of migration of Iraqi citizens in various forms remains considerably high.

IRAQ - RETURNEES, IDPS, REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 2017




REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM IRAQ 2017




FLIGHT MIGRATION TO THE EU

Over the last two decades, the Member States of the European Union have been main destinations for refugees and asylum seekers from Iraq. In 2018, a total of 44,735 asylum applications were submitted by Iraqi citizens in Member States of the EU.¹³ As stated, the total number of asylum applications submitted by Iraqi citizens had always correlated with the security situation in Iraq. Consequently, trends in annual application figures did not show steady developments but were characterised by sharp in- and decreases. During this period, the lowest annual value was recorded in 2004 with a total of 7,955 applications, the highest annual value in 2016 with a total of 130,100 applications. The sharpest annual increase in applications was between 2014 and 2015, when the number of annual applications rose by almost five times from a total of 21,365 applications in 2014 to a total of 124,970 applications in 2015. The sharpest decrease was between 2016 and 2017, when the number of annual applications fell by 60.2 % in 2017 from a total of 130,100 applications to a total of 51,790 applications in 2017. Thus and although the years of the “refugee crisis” 2015/2016 formed an exception also with regard to the numbers of asylum applications from Iraqi citizens, the number for 2018 is still the fourth highest of the last twenty years.

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY IRAQI CITIZENS IN THE EU 2000 - 2018





Like in previous years, Iraq was one of the major countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU. It ranked third behind Syria (83,740 applications in total or 13 %) and Afghanistan (45,990 in total or 7.1 %), followed by Pakistan (29,055 in total or 4.5 %), Nigeria (25,890 in total or 4 %), Iran (25,095 in total or 3.9 %), Turkey (23,025 in total or 3.6 %), Albania (22,220 in total or 3.4 %), Eritrea (15,585 in total or 2.4 %) and Russia (15,245 in total or 2.4 %).

The afore-mentioned “clustering” of third country populations (in a small number of EU Member States) can also be observed for asylum seekers from Iraq in the year 2018. 78.9 % of all asylum applications submitted by Iraqi citizens were lodged in five EU Member States. Germany maintained its position as most important destination in the EU. It recorded 40.1 % of all applications from Iraqi applicants (17,950 applications in total), followed by Greece (9,730 applications in total or 21.7 %), the United Kingdom (3,640 in total or 8.1 %), France (2,255 in total or 5 %) and Belgium (1,755 in total or 3.9 %).

Asylum seekers from Iraq are predominantly male and very young. In 2018, 60.8 % of all applicants were male and 39.2 % female. Notwithstanding this gender imbalance, a certain trend towards a feminisation of Iraqi asylum seekers was to be observed. Between 2008 and 2018 the share of females among asylum seekers from Iraq increased by 62.9 %. In 2018, 42 % of all asylum seekers from Iraq

were 18 years or younger. In line with an overall trend towards younger asylum seekers in the EU, the share of minors among asylum seekers from Iraq was almost twice as high than in 2008 when it had been 22.8 %.¹⁴

In 2018, a total of 17,710 applicants from Iraq received a positive first instance decision on their asylum application in an EU Member States. Thus, positive decisions referred to granting of refugee status, subsidiary protection status, authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons and temporary protection. Between 2008 and 2018 there were a total of 220,930 positive first instance decisions and a total of 27,625 positive final decisions in appeal or review.¹⁵ Against the background of age and gender distribution of Iraqi asylum seekers these figures also give an indication about the quantitative dimension integration policies and policies on family reunification and formation will have to address in the coming years.

IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND RETURN

It is by definition not possible to precisely measure the size of irregular migration to the European Union or the size of populations residing illegally on the territory of the European Union. Estimates on irregular migration are based on extrapolations of other data sets like apprehensions at external borders or within the territory of States, asylum


statistics, regularisations or expulsions/leave orders. These statistics refer to foreign nationals who do not – or no longer – fulfil the legal conditions for entry to, presence in or residence on the territory of a state. However, they do not provide information on the concrete migration history or motivations of the individuals affected. Thus, they have to be perceived as rather weak indicators for the real extent of irregular migration from a specific country of origin.


In the context of migration from Iraq to Europe, the available indicators are strongly related to the fact that a large share of Iraqi nationals who arrive in the EU in an irregular way subsequently apply for asylum in one of its Member States. For 2018, Frontex recorded a total of 150,114 illegal border crossings at the external borders of the Member States of the EU and Schengen Associated Countries.¹⁶ Roughly 7 % of all apprehended migrants were Iraqi citizens (9,843 between January and November 2018). Most of them (88.7 %) were apprehended at the so called Eastern Mediterranean Route. Given the total number of asylum applications submitted by Iraqi citizens in 2018 (a total of 44,775 asylum applications), it can be assumed that many applicants from Iraq have entered the EU via other routes and/or undetected. In the years 2008 to 2018, an average number of 20,600 leave orders were issued to Iraqi citizens in the EU every year. In 2018, a total of 24,580 leave orders were issued to Iraqi citizens, who accounted for 5.1 % of all leave orders for that year

(478,155 leave orders in total in 2018). Most leave orders were reported by Greece (7,745 leave orders in total or 31.5 %), followed by France (3,970 in total or 16.2 %), Sweden (3,160 in total or 12.7 %), Germany (3,085 in total or 12.6 %) and Finland (1,575 in total or 6.4 %).¹⁷

The actual return rate for Iraqi citizens, i.e the number of officially recorded returns of Iraqi citizens under a leave order, was 36.9 % in 2018 (9,080 recorded returns in comparison to 24,580 leave orders).¹⁸ Iraqi citizens accounted for 4.6 % of all recorded returns for that year (198,375 returns from the EU in total). The rate was slightly lower than the overall EU return rate for all citizens under the order to leave the EU (41.5 %). Thus, return rates to Iraq have fluctuated over the years, the highest rate was recorded in 2016 (54.9 %), the lowest in 2008 (17.8 %). In 2018, return rates to Iraq also fluctuated significantly between respective EU Member States. According to Eurostat data the return rates among the EU Member States, who had reported 1,000 leave orders or more for Iraqi citizens, moved between 3.3 % and 62.6 %. As these statistics do not provide information on voluntary returns which have not been officially recorded by the authorities, they have to be treated with caution. However, they still indicate general trends on returns from Europe to Iraq.

LEAVE ORDERS AND RECORDED RETURNS OF IRAQI CITIZENS FROM THE EU 2008 - 2018





CONCLUSIONS

Migration from Iraq to Europe has traditionally focused on a small number of European countries of destination. In 2018, app. 87.8 % of all Iraqi citizens in the EU resided in five EU Member States, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and Austria. Size and distribution of the Iraqi population in the EU are closely linked to the fact that flight migration is the main migration pattern between Iraq and the EU. Between 2000 and 2018 Iraqi citizens submitted a total of app. 680,000 asylum applications in the EU. In 2018, like in previous years, Iraq was one of the major countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU following Syria and Afghanistan. Thus, the total of 44,735 asylum applications was the fourth highest number of applicants from Iraq during the last twenty years. The number of asylum seekers from Iraq had reached its absolute peak during the refugee crisis in 2016 when it had amounted to a total of 130,100 applications before the annual application figures went down again. The “clustering” in a small number of EU Member States can also be observed for asylum seekers from Iraq. In 2018, 78.9 % of all asylum applications from Iraqi citizens were submitted in five EU Member States, namely Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. Asylum seekers from Iraq are predominantly male and very young. This fact will have to be taken into account by integration policies and policies on family reunification in the next years. Conflict has been

the main driver of flight and migration from Iraq during the last twenty years and will most probably continue to be so in the future. According to the Global Peace Index, Iraq ranks among the five least peaceful countries in the world and ranks fourth-to-last regarding societal and overall security. High youth unemployment, an expected increase in the population under 35 years by 10.9 million until 2030 and the growing exposure of the Iraqi population to environmental risks and the effects of climate change will cause additional pressures. It is assumed that today the total number of Iraqi citizens who are refugees, internally displaced or returnees to their home country amounts to more than 6.7 million persons. Consequently, the potential of flight migration of Iraqi citizens remains high and it is likely that a certain share of the displaced population will try to reach Europe in the future.

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

LEGEND

- BOUNDARIES**
- international border
 - - - - - disputed border

- WATERS**
- lake
 - stream, river

- NAMES**
- Eritrea country
 - Asmara capital
 - Madeira island
 - Lake Nasser waters

SCALE 1 : 30 000 000



MAP SOURCES

Natural Earth


PROJECTION

Robinson, WGS84





TOPOGRAPHY

LEGEND

LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND WATERS	
	main railway, minor railway
	railway under construction
	motorway, main road
	minor road, track
	road under construction
	lake
	stream, river

NAMES AND MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION	
Iraq	country
<i>Artsakh</i>	disputed territory
BAGHDAD	capital
Kirkuk	settlement more than 1 million inhabitants
Arbil	settlement 500 000 to 1 million inhabitants
Ramadi	settlement 100 000 to 500 000 inhabitants
Tikrit	settlement 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants
Syrian Desert	landscape/mountain range
<i>Cheekha Dar</i>	Mountain summit and height
▲ 3 611	
<i>Lake Milh</i>	waters

BOUNDARIES	
	international border, international maritime border (notional)
	IRQ administrative boundaries, disputed border

HYSOMETRIC LAYER	
	above 5 000 m
	4 000 to 5 000 m
	3 000 to 4 000 m
	2 000 to 3 000 m
	1 000 to 2 000 m
	500 to 1 000 m
	200 to 500 m
	0 to 200 m
	land below sea level
	-200 to 0 m
	-500 to -200 m
	-1 000 to -500 m
	less than -1 000 m

SCALE 1 : 7 000 000



PROJECTION

Robinson, WGS84



Turkey

YEREVAN

Armenia

Azerbaijan

BAKU

AZE

Tabriz

Iran

Syria

Iraq

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Syrian Desert

JOR

An Nafud

KUWAIT

Al Ahmadi

Al Mish'ab

Al Wari'ah

Hafar al Batin

Al Farwaniyah

Jahra

Basra

RELIGIOUS GROUPS

LEGEND

BOUNDARIES	
	international border
	international maritime border (notional)
	disputed border
WATERS	
	lake
	stream, river
NAMES AND MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION	
Iraq	country
<i>Artsakh</i>	disputed territory
□ BAGHDAD	capital
○ Kirkuk	settlement more than 1 million inhabitants
○ Arbil	settlement 500 000 to 1 million inhabitants
● Ramadi	settlement 100 000 to 500 000 inhabitants
● Tikrit	settlement 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants
<i>Lake Milh</i>	waters

SCALE 1 : 7 000 000



PROJECTION

Robinson, WGS84

RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	59	Sunni Muslims
	60	Twelver Shia Muslims
	59/60	Sunni Muslims and Twelver Shia Muslims
	52	Alevis
	59/52	Sunni Muslims and Alevis
	53	Christians
	61	Yezidis/Kaka'i/Yarsani/Ahl-e Haqq

ETHNIC GROUPS

LEGEND

BOUNDARIES	
	international border
	international maritime border (notional)
	disputed border
WATERS	
	lake
	stream, river
NAMES AND MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION	
Iraq	country
<i>Artsakh</i>	disputed territory
BAGHDAD	capital
Kirkuk	settlement more than 1 million inhabitants
Arbil	settlement 500 000 to 1 million inhabitants
Ramadi	settlement 100 000 to 500 000 inhabitants
Tikrit	settlement 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants
<i>Lake Milh</i>	waters

SCALE 1 : 7 000 000




PROJECTION

Robinson, WGS84

ETHNIC GROUPS (LANGUAGES)

	2	Arabs (Arabic speaking)
	26	Turks (Turkish speaking)
	10	Kurds (Kurdish speaking)
	26/10	Turks and Kurds
	2/10	Arabs and Kurds
	25	Turkmens (Turkmen speaking)
	3	Armenians, Assyrians, Arameans, Chaldeans and other Christians (non-Arabic speaking)
	17	Persians (Persian speaking)
	4	Azeris (Azeri speaking)
	11	Lurs, including Bakhtiari (speaking Luri languages)
	22	Talysh, Gilaki and Mazanderani (speaking NW-Iranian languages such as Talysh, Gilaki and Mazanderani)




OIL AND GAS FIELDS

LEGEND

- BOUNDARIES**
-  international border
 -  international maritime border (notional)
 -  disputed border


- WATERS**
-  lake
 -  stream, river

- NAMES AND MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION**
- Iraq** country
 - Artsakh* disputed territory
 - **BAGHDAD** capital
 - **Kirkuk** settlement more than 1 million inhabitants
 - **Arbil** settlement 500 000 to 1 million inhabitants
 - **Ramadi** settlement 100 000 to 500 000 inhabitants
 - **Tikrit** settlement 20 000 to 100 000 inhabitants
 - Lake Milh* waters



PROJECTION
Robinson, WGS84

 **OIL AND GAS FIELDS**



Turkey

Armenia

Azerbaijan



Syria

Mosul

Iran

Iraq

BAGHDAD

JOR

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Persian Gulf

SOURCES

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1-5 Economist Intelligence Unit

6 Economist Intelligence Unit and Central Bank of Iraq

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF BAGHDAD

1 See some of the media coverage of the 15th anniversary of the US invasion, for instance, as well as that of the elections in May 2018, of the protests that summer and various analyses of the political contestation marking the formation of the new Iraqi government under Prime Minister 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi — a process that has only recently come to completion. Public Radio International (12.3.2018): Fifteen years after the US entered Iraq, Baghdad breathes new life, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-03-12/fifteen-years-after-us-entered-iraq-baghdad-breathes-new-life>, accessed 15 July 2019; CGTN - China Global Television Network (26.3.2018): Baghdad: The mood on the street is guarded optimism, https://news.cgtn.com/news/34596a4e-306b7a6333566d54/share_p.html, accessed 15 July 2019; Sarwar Abdullah (2.8.2018): After IS, Iraq's Major Challenge is Corruption, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/after-is-iraqs-major-challenge-is-corruption>, accessed 15 July 2019; Renad Mansour (2.2019): Iraq's 2018 Government Formation: Unpacking the friction between reform and the status quo, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100099/1/>

Mansour_Iraq_s_2018_government_formation_2019.pdf, accessed 15 July 2019; LA Times (27.1.2019): Baghdad is re-emerging from 15 blood-soaked years, but the city now barely functions, <https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-baghdad-revival-20190127-story.html>, accessed 15 July 2019.

2 Iraq is not listed on the 2019 Index of Economic Freedom, for instance, published annually by the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. This, according to the Heritage Foundation, is “for lack of reliable relevant data”, The Heritage Foundation (2019): 2019 Index of Economic Freedom, <https://www.heritage.org/index/country/iraq>, accessed 15 July 2019.

3 Frank R. Gunter (2013): *The Political Economy of Iraq: Restoring Balance in a Post-Conflict Society*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 6.

4 Frank R. Gunter (2013): *The Political Economy of Iraq: Restoring Balance in a Post-Conflict Society*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 6.

5 Ibid., p. 7.

6 Atlantic Council (7.2018): *Beyond Security: Stabilization, Governance, and Socioeconomic Challenges in Iraq*, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Beyond_Security_-_Stabilization_Governance_and_Economic_Challenges.pdf, p. 1, accessed 11 July 2019.

7 CIA Factbook (7.7.2019): Iraq - People and Society, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>, accessed 12 July 2019.

8 'Abd al-Jabbār al-'Atābī (2017): *Sukkān al-'irāq izdādū ilā 37 milyūnan wa-l-namū mā zāla murtafi'an*, <https://elaph.com/Web/News/2017/12/1181801.html>, cited in Atlantic Council, p. 4, accessed 12 July 2019.

9 Atlantic Council (7.2018).

10 Pew Research Forum (2.4.2015): 10 Countries With the Largest Muslim Populations, 2010 and 2050, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/pf_15-04-02_projection_stables74/, accessed 15 July 2019. This calculation must have had a lower base population in view than the current 40 million. On the basis of those, the population of Iraq will be 88 million by 2050. That is with an annual growth rate of 2.6 %. If an annual growth rate of 3 % is assumed and the current CIA estimate of 40 million is the basis, then the population of Iraq will be 100 million by 2015.

11 CIA Factbook (7.7.2019).

12 Atlantic Council (7.2018), p. 4 and 13, "The estimated rate of unemployment among the youth is 30 percent and this number is likely to increase in the coming years."

13 Ibid., p. 4. For an in-depth analysis of the effects of a growing population on resources, security, social relations and migration, see Georgakis Abbott and Stivachtis

(28.5.2019): Demography, Migration and Security in the Middle East, <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/05/28/demography-migration-and-security-in-the-middle-east/>, accessed 12 July 2019.

14 Gunter (2013), p. 9.

15 Ibid., p. 10.

16 World Bank (1.4.2019): Iraq—Overview, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview>, accessed 12 July 2019.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Aljazeera (10.5.2019): Can Iraq rebuild its economy?, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2019/05/iraq-rebuild-economy-190510124906515.html>, accessed 12 July 2019.

20 World Bank (1.4.2019): Iraq—Overview, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview>, accessed 12 July 2019; cf. also France24 (24.1.2019): Iraq parliament approves 2019 budget, one of largest ever, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190124-iraq-parliament-approves-2019-budget-one-largest-ever>, accessed 12 July 2019; Iraq Energy Institute (29.10.2018): Iraq's 2019 Draft Budget Law Analysis, <https://iraqenergy.org/product/iraqs-2019-draft-budget-law-analysis-report/>, accessed 12 July 2019.

21 NCCI - NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (12.2015): Baghdad Governorate Profile, https://www.ncciraq.org/images/info/bygov/NCCI_Baghdad_Governorate_Profile.pdf, accessed 11 July 2019.

22 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019): Baghdad, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Baghdad>, accessed 16 July 2019.

23 EASO - European Asylum Support Office (2.2019): COI Report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators, <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/Iraq-key-socio-economic-indicators.pdf>, accessed 11 July 2019.

24 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Phebe Marr and Ibrahim Marashi (2017): *The History of Modern Iraq*, London: Taylor and Francis.

28 Atlantic Council (7.2018); K4D (21.8.2018): *Governance and Development in Iraq*, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b4328c4e5274a3764524d48/Governance_and_Development_in_Iraq.pdf, accessed 17 July, 2019.

29 NCCI (12.2015).

30 Ibid.

31 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).

- 32 NCCI (12.2015).
- 33 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).
- 34 NCCI (12.2015).
- 35 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).
- 36 The Guardian (7.1.2019): Baghdad at 10 million: fragile dreams of normality as megacity status beckons, <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jan/07/baghdad-at-10-million-fragile-dreams-of-normality-as-megacity-status-beckons>, accessed 11 July 2019.
- 37 CIA Factbook (7.7.2019).
- 38 World Population Review (2019): Population of Cities in Iraq – 2019, <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iraq-population/cities/>, accessed 15 July 2019.
- 39 Population of 2019 (2019): Population Of Baghdad 2019, <https://populationof2019.com/population-of-baghdad-2019.html>, accessed 15 July 2019.
- 40 Gunter (2013), pp. 7-8.
- 41 Gunter (2013), p. 9.
- 42 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).
- 43 Michael Izady (2015): Baghdad: Ethnic Composition in 2015 – The metropolitan area and the province, http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Baghdad_Ethnic_2015_lg.png, accessed 18 July 2019.

44 UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (15.1.2018): Situation of Christians in Baghdad, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a66f80e4.pdf>, accessed 18 July 2019. For Kurds, see Rudaw (9.4.2016): Baghdad's Kurdish population sees dramatic decline, official data shows, <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/090420162>, accessed 18 July 2019.

45 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).

46 The Wall Street Journal (2.7.2014): South Asian Migrant Workers Stuck in Wartorn Iraq, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-asian-migrant-workers-stuck-in-wartorn-iraq-1404317860>, accessed 18 July 2019; The Arab Weekly (18.2.2018): Foreign workers seeking jobs in Iraq despite perils, <https://thearabweekly.com/foreign-workers-seeking-jobs-iraq-despite-perils>, accessed 18 July 2019.

47 For a more comprehensive treatment of current socio-economic questions in Iraq, see the latest publication by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2.2019): COI Report Iraq: Key socio-economic indicators, <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/Iraq-key-socio-economic-indicators.pdf>, accessed 18 July 2019. The following will provide summary excerpts of some of the sources provided by EASO.

48 NCCI (12.2015): Baghdad Governorate Profile, https://www.ncciraq.org/images/infobygov/NCCI_Baghdad_Governorate_Profile.pdf, accessed 16 July 2019; European Asy-

lum Support Office (EASO) (2.2019), p. 43.

49 UNDP - United Nations Development Programme (2014): Iraq Human Development Report: Iraqi Youth Challenges and Opportunities, p. 164, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/undp-iq_iraqnhdr2014-english.pdf, accessed 18 July 2019.

50 World Bank (9.1.2018): Baghdad Water Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project, p. 9, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947941487509910477/pdf/ITM00184-P162094-02-19-2017-1487509904633.pdf>, accessed 22 July 2019.

51 European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2.2019), p. 44.

52 Gunter, p. 14.

53 Encyclopaedia Britannica (17.1.2019).

54 IOM (3.2017): Integrated Location Assessment—Part II: Governorate Profiles, p. 11, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment_Part%20II_Governorate%20Profiles_March%202017_o.pdf, accessed 18 July 2019, as cited by EASO (2.2019), p. 43, fn. 323.

55 Arab NGO Network for Development (2016): Informal Labour Iraq, <http://www.annd.org/cd/arabwatch2016/pdf/english/12.pdf>, accessed 18 July 2019.

56 UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (20.2.2019): Assessment of the Labour Market & Skills Analysis: Iraq and Kurdistan Region-Iraq: Informal Sector, http://cosit.gov.iq/documents/population/demographic/reports/UNESCO-EU%20LMS%20Report_Informal_20022019.pdf, accessed 21 July 2019.

57 EASO (2.2019).

58 World Bank (9.1.2018): Project Appraisal: Baghdad Water Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project, p. 9, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/869811517626846051/pdf/BAGHDAD-NEWPAD-01112018.pdf>, accessed 21 July 2019.

59 World Bank (1.4.2019): Iraq—Overview, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview>, accessed 21 July 2019.

60 UNAMI - United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (2019): Country Profile, http://www.uniraq.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=941&Itemid=472&lang=en, accessed 22 July 2019.

61 EASO (2.2019), p. 53.

62 EASO (2.2019), pp. 45-48.

63 EASO (2.2019), p. 53.

64 The Arab Weekly (4.3.2016): Poverty in Iraq dramatically rises, <https://thearabweekly.com/poverty-iraq-dramatical->

ly-rises, accessed 21 July 2019.

65 UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (26.2.2019): Iraq: 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan - Jan to Dec 2019, p. 7, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/iraq_2019_hrp_26_02_2019final_english.pdf, accessed 21 July 2019.

66 Aljazeera (3.8.2018): Iraq's farmers hit hard by water shortages, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2018/08/iraq-farmers-hit-hard-water-shortages-180802193258236.html>, accessed 21 July 2019.

67 EASO (2.2019), p. 60.

68 World Food Programme (WFP) (10.2018): National Strategic Review of Food Security and Nutrition in Iraq, p. 24, <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000102716/download/>, accessed 21 July 2019.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., p. 27.

71 World Bank (9.1.2018): Project Appraisal: Baghdad Water Supply and Sewerage Improvement Project, p. 12, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/869811517626846051/pdf/BAGHDAD-NEWPAD-01112018.pdf>, accessed 22 July 2019.

72 World Bank (31.1.2018): Iraq: 5 Million Residents in

Baghdad to Benefit from Improved Water Supply and Wastewater Services, <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-5-million-residents-baghdad-benefit-improved-water-supply-and-wastewater-services>, 22 July 2019.

73 EPIC - Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (18.7.2017): Drought in the land between two rives, <https://www.epic-usa.org/iraq-water/>, accessed 22 July 2019.

74 World Bank (10.1.2016): Baghdad Water and Sewerage Improvement Project: Project Information Document, p. 5, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/947941487509910477/pdf/ITM00184-PI62094-02-19-2017-1487509904633.pdf>, accessed 22 July 2019.

75 IOM (10.2017): Integrated Location Assessment II, http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20II/ILA%20II_PART2%20Governorate%20Profiles.pdf, accessed 22 July 2019.

76 World Bank (3.2.2017): Iraq: Systematic Country Diagnostic, p. 44, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/pdf/IRAQ-SCD-FINAL-cleared-02132017.pdf>, accessed 22 July 2019.

77 Ibid.

78 UNAMI - United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (2019): Country Profile, http://www.uniraq.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=941&Itemid=472&lang=en, accessed 22 July 2019.

79 The Guardian (7.1.2019): Baghdad at 10 million: fragile dreams of normality as megacity status beckons, <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jan/07/baghdad-at-10-million-fragile-dreams-of-normality-as-megacity-status-beckons>, accessed 22 July 2019.

80 Reuters (9.4.2018): As Baghdad life improves, some still seek refuge in its past, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-anniversary/as-baghdad-life-improves-some-still-seek-refuge-in-its-past-idUSKBN1HGoYP>, accessed 22 July 2019.

81 UN CERD – United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (22.11.2017): Combined twenty-second to twenty-fifth periodic reports submitted by Iraq under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2017, p. 34, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1483048/files/CERD_C_IRQ_22-25-EN.pdf, accessed 22 July 2019.

82 UN Habitat - United Nations Human Settlements Programme (19.9.2017): New research finds 3.2 million Iraqis living in informal settlements, <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/new-research-finds-32-million-iraqis-living-informal-settlements>, accessed 22 July 2019.

MIGRATION FROM IRAQ TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

1 ÖIF (2012): Katharina Baumschlager und Sabina Catar: Länderinformation Nr. 14 Irak, BM.I / Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2012.

2 The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy and health, access to education and knowledge, decent standard of living.

3 UNDP, Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, Briefing note for countries on the 2018 Statistical Update Iraq.

4 World Bank Open Data, accessed in June 2019 at <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

5 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition.

6 Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney, June 2019. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed in June 2019), p. 9.

7 AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, FI, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, NL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK.

8 Eurostat database, table population on 1 January by age group, sex and country of birth [migr_pop3ctb], accessed

in June 2019, own calculations.

9 Eurostat database, table acquisition of citizenship by age group, sex and former citizenship [migr_acq], accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

10 Eurostat database, table first permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship [migr_resfirst], accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

11 UNHCR Population Statistics Reference Database, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern, accessed in June 2019.

12 UNHCR fact sheet Iraq 2019, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/>, accessed in June 2019.

13 Eurostat database, table asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza], accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

14 Ibid.

15 Eurostat database, tables first instance decisions / final decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asydcfsta] and table, accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

16 Frontex, Detections of illegal border-crossings, <https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/detections-of-illegal-border-crossings>, accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

r7 Eurostat database, table third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (rounded) [migr_eiord], accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

r8 Eurostat database, table hird country nationals returned following an order to leave - annual data (rounded) [migr_eirtn], accessed in June 2019, own calculations.

IMPRINT

PUBLISHED BY

Peter Webinger, Wolfgang Taucher
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior
Herrengasse 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria
www.bmi.gv.at, BMI-V@bmi.gv.at

EDITORS

Alexander Schahbasi, Thomas Schrott
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

EDITORIAL TEAM

Marina Prohaska, Pamela Petrovic, Susanne Vrhovac,
Sebastian Aust, Xenia Bojanic
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

TRANSLATIONS

Sherin Yasin
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

CARTOGRAPHY

Wolfgang Wechselberger, Andreas Stummvoll
Institute for Military Geography

LAYOUT & DESIGN

Natalie Raskovic
Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

PRINT

Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

DISCLAIMER

The content of this publication was researched and edited with utmost care. Liability for the correctness, completeness and up-to-dateness of contents cannot be incurred. The Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, the publishers, editors, authors and individuals involved in the publication do not assume any liability for possible damages or consequences arising from the usage, application or dissemination of the contents offered. The responsibility for the correctness of information provided by third parties lies with respective publishers and thus excludes liability by the publishers, editors and authors of this volume. The contents of this publication do not represent positions of the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior, the publishers or the editors. The boundaries on the maps used in this publication do not imply official endorsement of acceptance. The publication does not claim completeness and is based on the quoted sources. The chapter "The socio-economic dynamics of Baghdad" was published as an analysis of the Austrian Country of Origin Information Unit (Staatendokumentation) and was adapted for the *regiones et res publicae* series.

COPYRIGHT

This publication and all the data therein are protected by copyright. All rights of utilization are reserved to the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior. Reproduction and distribution in any possible way – for commercial

and non-commercial usage – are prohibited without prior written permission by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.

PRIVACY NOTICE

The Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior processes data in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC) and the Austrian Data Protection Act (Federal Act concerning the Protection of Personal Data, Federal Law Gazette I No. 165/1999 as amended).

For the purpose of distribution, name, postal and e-mail addresses are stored. Recipients have the general right to information, rectification, deletion, restriction, data transferability, revocation and objection. The subscription can be canceled at any time (e-mail with the subject line "unsubscribe" to BMI-V@bmi.gv.at).

ISBN 978-3-903109-14-8

© 2019 Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior

NOTES

NOTES

NOTES

regiones et res publicae

I **SOMALIA**
Security, Minorities & Migration

2 **AFGHANISTAN**
2014 and beyond

3 **PAKISTAN**
Challenges & Perspectives

4 **THE KURDS**
History – Religion – Language – Politics

5 **SYRIA, IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN**
Mapping migration, social media and topography

6 **DEMOGRAPHICS**
Middle East & North Africa

7 **DEMOGRAPHICS**
Sub-Saharan Africa

8 **HERAT**
Eine sozioökonomische Fallstudie

9 **IRAQ**
Economics & Migration